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1. Objective
Political symbols are a central part of policies of nation-
alization, immigration and integration in all countries, 
Denmark not least (Adriansen 2003; Stoklund 2002). 
Here they have proved so signifi cant that after having 
been shaped and refi ned by the country’s public debates, 
the media and political actors of varying hue for years, 
they have developed into a comprehensive repertoire of 
symbolic politics, a political culture rooted in and fo-
cussed on the maintenance of a perceived mono-cultural 
Danishness – in an increasingly interdependent and cul-
turally diverse global context.
Th is article will engage with some of the political 
symbols and the symbolic politics (SP) which over the 
last decade have been developed in aid of the confi rma-
tion and reassertion of the borders between ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
in Denmark – and the ways such border and boundary 
symbols get deployed as discursive weapons in the fi ght 
against a threat which sometimes is demonized as both 
internal and external, but more and more frequently get 
played down, modifi ed or even neutralized in the context 
of more pragmatic perceptions of integration.
In consequence of this current tendency, the paper 
will fi nally discuss not only the symbolic politics of 
boundaries, but also new developments constraining the 
usefulness of old-style symbolic politics while in the proc-
ess introducing new boundaries and diff erent political 
priorities.
2. Political symbols, symbolic politics and the 
Other1
Symbolic politics (Adelman 1985; Hedetoft 1998 & 
2007: Kertzer 1988; Sears 1993; Voigt 1989) rests on the 
practical deployment of a variety of signs embedded in 
the collective cultural and psychological repertoire of na-
tions (Billig 1995; Boswell & Evans 1999; Hedetoft 1995; 
Herzfeld 1992; Löfgren 1989; Nora 1984-91). Umberto 
Eco (following Charles S. Peirce) once defi ned a sign as 
‘everything which can be taken as signifi cantly substitut-
ing for something else’ (Eco 1976: 7). Signs – and sym-
bols in particular – are inherently relational. Th ey refer 
to, stand for, and connote a referent which is external to 
the sign, whose properties may be factually unrelated to 
the autonomous meaning charge of the sign itself, and 
which, as Eco points out, ‘does not necessarily have to ex-
ist’ (ibid.), except in the collective imaginary of the group 
in question. Symbolic representations especially are char-
acterized by such ‘non-motivated’ links between sign and 
referent. A ‘rose’, per se, has little to do with ‘love’; a ‘lion’, 
as such, is unrelated to ‘courage’; and a red rectangular 
piece of cloth with a white cross superimposed reveals 
no trace of Danish nationalism. Yet the links are there; 
we know, by tacit agreement and conventional use, that 
a rose ‘is’ a symbol of love, a lion of courage, and the red 
and white piece of cloth of the Danish nation state. In 
Michael Walzer’s classic wording on the nation-state and 
symbolism, the nation ‘is invisible; it must be personifi ed 
before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, 
imagined before it can be conceived’ (Walzer 1967: 194). 
It all seems so natural, although it is embedded in codes 
– second-order signs – that we need to be able to decipher 
in order to make sense of them.2 
SP depends for its success on the same kind of proc-
ess – a process of osmosis producing, pace Eco, ‘a socially 
shared notion of the thing that the community is engaged 
to take as if it were in itself true’ (ibid.). It is an exercise 
steeped in signs and discourses intended to produce con-
sensual agreement between representers (political agents, 
the media) and represented (peoples, electorates, ethnic 
groups). Th e precondition of such identifi cation is that 
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relations and states of aff air are successfully naturalized 
through narratives and fi ctions (myths, legends, rituals) 
of the non-political state (Anderson 1983/1991; Hedetoft 
1995; Kapferer 1988). Th is is the paradox of all SP: as a 
political activity it is crucially dependent on mobilizing 
images of the ‘state of nature’, of organic relations, his-
torical continuities, and anthropological invariables – in 
other words on coming across as the natural articulation 
of the most fundamental desires and ambitions of people. 
Th is is in the ideal world, however. In reality, contexts 
and causes of SP are frequently confl ictual and riddled 
with unresolved tensions, casting either the people (top-
down discourses of unreasonable popular demands) or 
the state (bottom-up discourses of elite failure) as prob-
lems for national unity. Conversely, it is precisely on the 
background of such confl icts that SP is mobilized in order 
to reinstate order and again ‘make sense’ of the (national) 
world by calling on time-honoured virtues, morals, val-
ues, and achievements of the collectivity – or to attempt 
to forge a new and better community within or across 
traditional political boundary-lines (which in turn will 
tap into – or engineer – its own myths, legends, and 
origins). Th e success or failure of such discourses depend 
on the one hand on objective conditions and contextual 
factors (external relations, power struggles, (in)stability, 
interest constellations, resources), but also on the degree 
of rhetorical persuasiveness and leadership projection 
(charisma and trustworthiness) of core political actors; on 
timing and strategic orchestration (rational deployment 
of authority); and on how well the symbolism employed 
aligns itself with positively perceived images and cultural 
properties of the nation (traditionalism and continuity). 
Or diff erently expressed: on the effi  cient application to 
the ‘naturalist’ universe of symbolic politics of Max We-
ber’s three forms of authority: traditional, charismatic, 
and rational-bureaucratic (Weber 1948/1994).
At the center of many such eff orts we invariably en-
counter examples of the symbolization of the boundary 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Th is can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from signs that directly try to capture the pos-
tulated essence of physical-geographical borders (or their 
gradual erosion) to much more subtle and ‘unmarked’ 
representations of cultural, phenotypical, political or 
ethnic boundaries – e.g. in the shape of symbolic dual-
isms such as ‘darkness’ vs. ‘light’ (: read oppression versus 
freedom, East versus West) and attendant twilight zones 
between them. More on this below. What needs to be 
stressed at this point is that, in keeping with the nature 
of second-order signs, boundaries – lines separating the 
positively valorized subject from the more or less negative 
object – will rarely be represented as such but rather in 
the form of e.g. displaced images of personal properties, 
civilizational attributes, collective belief-systems, or pro-
jected consequences. 
Th us, the rationale of SP is multiple and constitutes a 
permanent companion of more rationally informed ini-
tiatives in modern political regimes, since it is directed to-
ward affi  rming or strengthening identities rather than be-
ing concerned with the pursuit of interests, or diff erently 
put, with pursuing interests in the form of normative 
or value-oriented politics. SP is therefore more aff ective 
than cognitive, more rhetorical than substantive, more 
normative than pragmatic, more ideational than mate-
rial – but more often than not has profound political and 
material consequences on real policies practically pur-
sued. In functional terms, it is aimed at the maintenance 
of political legitimacy. Hence, SP consists of exercises 
in persuasive communication and, sometimes, political 
mobilization (rallying sympathies and mobilizing against 
threats), exercises aimed at reconstituting the political 
and cultural boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, angels 
and demons, inclusion and exclusion, homeness and for-
eignness. It is concerned with drawing and redrawing 
boundaries, setting up zones of engagement, mediation 
or ‘demilitarization’ in between, recapturing or renegoti-
ating territory – cultural, geographical, psychological, or 
all of these at the same time. It is rather instructive that 
‘territory’ (ours, that is – appropriated and domesticated 
violently to the exclusion of the Other) is the close ety-
mological cousin of ‘terror’ (Gottmann 1975; O’Leary, 
Lustick & Gallaghy 2001: 3).
It follows that SP is most prominent in situations of 
instability, perceived threat, social anomie, or other situ-
ations characterized by confl ict and tension. It is most 
markedly, though far from exclusively deployed by mi-
nority groups in claims-making and highly politicized 
contexts, as Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s 
impassioned plea (in itself not devoid of SP rhetoric) 
from 1996 – in a situation when separatist tendencies in 
Quebec and among indigenous peoples were threatening 
the cohesiveness of the country – makes it clear:
‘Our country is sick of symbolic politics, and (…)
it may die from this disease. In symbolic politics, 
unlike ordinary politics, everything becomes a 
matter of black and white. Positions are turned 
into sacred ideals on which no compromise is 
possible. (…) So I would ask all of us in the next 
few months to be careful in our assessments and 
our rhetoric, to avoid emotionally laden language 
and symbolic politics that could destroy this 
country. We cannot allow Canada to die of 
symbolic politics.’ (Chrétien 1996)
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Appealing to cohesion, defense of identity and terri-
tory, or historical traditions and cultural homogeneity 
is clearly most acutely called for when the community 
or the state is imagined as threatened. More specifi cally, 
we can distinguish between three modes of SP: the SP 
of securitization and existential threat, triggered by pre-
dicaments of war, sudden and thoroughgoing political or 
economic crises, social cleavages, or natural disasters; the 
SP of systemic change, drawn on in situations where politi-
cal regimes are facing serious transformative challenges 
of a social, economic, or political nature, implying new 
forms of adaptation and inner cohesion, and hence a re-
think of identity structures and relations of trust; and the 
SP of civic discontent and moral emergency, activated, for 
instance, in connection with responses to immigration, 
marginalization and erosion of national sovereignty.3 
Th e three modes are not always clearly distinguishable 
in political and social practice. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to think of them as discrete modes fi tting diff erent situa-
tions and to a large extent determining how the cultural 
and aesthetic repertoire at the disposal of SP is deployed 
in specifi c contexts. In the following, the main focus will 
be placed on the third and last of these modes: the SP of 
Danish immigration discourse, the imagery it employs to 
conjure up ideas of eroding borders and cultural emer-
gency, and its current trajectory.
3. Th e symbolic politics of immigration and the 
Danish case
In principle, immigration in both political and cultural 
terms is a serious challenge to all national communities 
and states, because it defi es some of the most basic as-
sumptions on which European nation states are based 
and which facilitate interaction, trust, and solidary re-
lations between politics and people: clear boundaries, 
ethnic homogeneity, a common history and culture, 
same language, shared socialization and political cul-
ture, consensual values etc (Gellner 1983; Goodhart 
2004; Hall 1998; Hedetoft & Hjort 2002; Hobsbawm 
1990; Nussbaum 1996; Renan 1882/1990). In fact, im-
migration (particularly certain groups of immigrants in 
sizeable numbers) challenges the successfully naturalized 
state (Denmark being a prime example). For the same 
reason, the inevitable and sizeable demographic move-
ments which nevertheless occur across the political and 
cultural boundaries structuring our worldviews and so-
cial practices must necessarily provide fertile ground for 
symbolic politics – and for constantly reactivating the 
cultural stock-in-trade by appealing, often in outspo-
kenly populist forms, to the fears, loyalties, and moral ha-
bitus of nationalist audiences. Migration, especially when 
it is sizeable and visible (read: derives from areas where 
people’s physiological features make them stand out) and 
can be represented as itself a sign of more comprehen-
sive threats (read: globalization, Islam and extremism), is 
thus a universal breeding ground for securitization dis-
courses of moral panics, apocalyptic demagoguery, and 
discourses of ethnic purifi cation, but also for domestic 
dissension and international criticism based on the sym-
bolic politics of universal rights and minority protection. 
Immigration (and its corollary, cultural pluralism) ruffl  es 
the feathers of the national compact and its arduously 
achieved common identity. It triggers a variety of political 
reactions (e.g. neo-conservatism), debates and discourses 
(eg social cohesion), and policy initiatives (e.g. practical 
integration measures; border control) intended to either 
mobilize people around and by means of the national 
narratives or to soothe the same people by appealing to 
their humanitarian sympathies while insisting that mul-
ticultural solutions do not necessarily undermine the co-
hesiveness of the community, but should be regarded as 
socio-economic supplement or cultural enrichment.
Indubitably, however, it is the SP discourses of the 
former variant – populist policies of identity appealing 
to people’s national ‘instincts’ – that attract most pub-
lic attention and political support (Stolcke 1995; Wodak 
& van Dijk 2000). In these discourses, immigrants are 
framed as problems which threaten the ideally clear-cut 
and nicely-drawn boundaries of national communities 
(Berger 1998; Parekh 2000), by failing or refusing to 
‘integrate’ properly, living off  welfare benefi ts rather their 
own independent income, setting up ‘parallel societies’ 
(also called ghettoes), representing cultures of crime, vio-
lence, and paternalism that run counter to democratic 
norms, or just failing to display the engagement, partici-
pation, economic initiative, loyalty, and gratitude that are 
to be expected of newcomers. In the terms of a political 
rhetoric projecting (even sometimes freely constructing) 
such challenges, the national community must defend 
itself against cultural encroachments and impending ero-
sion (Ascherson 2004; Goodhart 2004). 
In turn, the result is frequently (and increasingly) ral-
lying cries for more proactive cultural or value-oriented 
debates, reminding people of the need to come to their 
senses before it is too late, appealing to (other) politicians 
to take immediate action, and providing the moral back-
ground and legitimation of remedial practices in the form 
of restrictive immigration and repatriation laws as well 
as tougher integration measures (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
forthcoming; Guiraudon & Joppke 2001; Schendel & 
Abraham 2005; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). In this 
way, symbolic politics, normative culturalism, and border 
policies complement each other in the case of immigra-
tion. 
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Th e following illustrates in exemplary manner such 
migration-based and boundary-sensitive SP discourse, 
taken from a debate in the Danish Parliament (April 
2002) on a proposal for the conferment of citizenship to 
named immigrants. 
“I recently heard about a school principal from 
Nørrebro [inner-city area of Copenhagen]. One 
day she met the father of some Turkish children in 
her school, accosted him and complained that his 
chidren did not speak Danish: ‘When they live in 
Denmark, they must speak Danish’. The Turkish 
father looked at her and replied, ‘Do we live in 
Denmark? No, we live in Mjølnerparken [concen-
tration of council housing with a majority of 
ethnic-minority residents], and here only 2% of 
the residents are Danish. No, we do not live in 
Denmark.’ (…) Indeed, it is becoming a very 
strange thing to be a Dane in this country, for 
step by step, bit by bit Danes are being turned 
into strangers in their own land. It is a historic 
and national disaster, which is taking place. It is 
the slow extinction of the Danish people that 
Parliament is allowing to happen. For let us not 
forget who is responsible for the growing aliena-
tion of Danes in Denmark: It is this very Parlia-
ment. [The proposal before us is] irresponsible, 
immoral, treasonous.” (Danish Parliament 2002)
Th e speaker, Søren Krarup, hails from the Danish 
People’s Party, which has, more than any other party in 
Denmark, projected itself on an anti-immigrant agenda 
and since 2001 has provided parliamentary support for the 
Liberal-Conservative government. Th e debate as a whole 
lasted for the better part of two days and was liberally 
spiced with often quite detailed and abstruse references to 
and interpretations of the historical origins, foundational 
texts, myths of unity, and cultural values of ‘Danishness’ 
(Gundelach, Iversen & Warburg 2008; Hedetoft 2007; 
Smith 1986), although a majority, not surprisingly, took 
issue with the direct attack against Parliament for der-
eliction of its national duty and although the political 
conclusions drawn by diff erent parties in terms of sup-
porting the bill or not diff ered signifi cantly. In fact, most 
members turned out to be in favour of ‘naturalizing’ the 
6.163 people that it concretely concerned. Nevertheless, 
the discursive tenor of the debate was set by the symbolic 
politics of identity embedded in the quotation and almost 
all addressed the cultural concerns and political charges 
contained in it on a note of respectful recognition and 
sympathy as regards the goal of national unity and the 
worries about failed integration that it articulates. 
Th ere was, in other words, if not full agreement, at 
least widespread consensus that immigration / immi-
grants constitute a serious challenge; that emergency dis-
courses are not completely misplaced; and that policies 
based on values, traditions, and the history of unitary 
identity were called for. Th e agenda had clearly shifted 
from one mainly focused on instrumental, problem-solv-
ing approaches to integration issues to one deeply infused 
with the politics and negotiations of symbolic bounda-
ries and belonging. Th e border is here perceived to have 
shifted from the external border to domestic territory, 
which in turn is argued to have been colonized by people 
of non-Danish extraction. ‘Foreignness’ is thus not only 
in our midst as a cultural presence, but as a piece of Dan-
ish land as well.
Immigration as a policy fi eld and a trigger of sym-
bolic politics of the moral emergency type is interest-
ing because it straddles three major modalities of nation/
state interaction (Hedetoft 2004 & 2007, 594-96): the 
imperative (the top-down nationalization of the masses; 
e.g. Mosse 1975), the indicative (the banality of success-
ful national identity; e.g. Billig 1995), and the subjunc-
tive (the national and/or political dream of sovereignty; 
e.g. Gibernau 1999). It is mostly based on the indicative 
as the point of factual or alleged departure, but on this 
bases weaves imperative discourses (‘they’ must now be 
integrated and assimilated, and we need some tough talk 
and policies to achieve this state of integration and new-
found cohesion) together with subjunctive ones mainly 
targeted at the ethno-cultural core community (if only 
we were back to the good old days – alternatively let us 
do all we can to reconstitute ourselves as a sovereign and 
cohesive entity and return to ‘banality’). In this way, the 
SP of immigration, by conjuring up many small emergen-
cies and moral panics, works not just as a discourse of 
confl ict and controversy, but also as a constant unifi er, 
by giving political actors the opportunity to reiterate the 
basis and boundaries of commonality and make full use 
of the national repository of cultural symbols.
Th e next section will show that symbolic politics 
based on antagonistic thinking and catch-all symbols of 
Otherness persists, but also that new signs and discourses 
are beginning to appear, developments indicating new 
boundaries, new visions and experiences of integration, 
a novel integration reality, and in some measure a learn-
ing process among political actors and the public at large 
following the Cartoon Aff air and its global aftermath 
(Hedetoft 2006).
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4. Burkas and babies – from experience to 
innocence? 
Th e two images above are symbolic representations of 
recent debates and developments in Danish attempts to 
conjure up threats to Danishness from immigrant cul-
tures and to reassert the natural basis of Danish identity 
in conjunction with integration. At the same time they 
subtly indicate a signifi cant recent change in and modi-
fi cation of the symbolic boundary between ‘them’ and 
‘us’ (in turn refl ecting an underlying change of economic 
and political conditions), the former image (‘experience’) 
expressing the traditional preference for exclusion of the 
alien in our midst, the second (‘innocence’) depicting an 
alternative modality of inclusion and almost naivistic as-
similation of the new-born Dane of foreign extraction – 
the alter ego of boundary-drawing, which simultaneously 
is a warped refl ection of real changes in the integration 
and participation of ‘new Danes’ on the labour market 
and beyond. Th is will be further addressed in the next 
section.
Th e fi rst picture symbolizes the so-called Burka de-
bate, which unfolded in the autumn of 2009. An exten-
sion of the protracted debate about the Muslim veil in 
Denmark as well as many other European countries, the 
Burka (and the Niqab) was fi rst posited as a real integra-
tion problem by leading members of the Conservative 
Party, in an attempt to capitalize on anti-immigrant sen-
sibilities among citizens and to capture voters from the 
Danish People’s Party by hijacking their most prominent 
political cause and turning a negative tide for the Con-
servatives. Th ere was no specifi c issue at stake or domestic 
debate going on making it imperative let alone worth 
while to produce an image of emergency and insecurity 
(the Burka had already been introduced in France as a 
potential social problem, but this must be regarded as a 
welcome condition of rather than a reason for bringing up 
the topic in Denmark). So, virtually out of the blue the 
Conservatives, probably looking for a cause that might 
enhance their popularity and public visibility, proposed 
an unqualifi ed legal ban on the Burka and the Niqab, 
since they allegedly encapsulated everything that ‘we’ are 
not: oppression, female subjugation, un-freedom, lack of 
democracy and Islamic despotism. Simultaneously, the 
implicit assumption was that this was a real growing 
problem of considerable magnitude.
It soon emerged that neither had the Conservatives 
had this initiative approved by their partner in Govern-
ment, the Liberal Party, nor had they investigated the 
real extent of the problem, let alone checked the legal 
status or ramifi cations of their proposal – which eventu-
ally was deemed unconstitutional. Th e proposal there-
fore immediately gave birth to a heated debate with the 
Conservatives on the defensive, being hard pressed for a 
political justifi cation for launching into this hornet’s nest 
of political symbolism. 
In order to restore order and unity to the Government 
and probably save the Conservatives from a humiliating 
retreat, the Prime Minister (Lars Løkke Rasmussen from 
the Liberal Party) decided to set up a ‘Burka Committee’ 
with the remit to analyze the problem and report back to 
him in due course.
If this was a pacifi er intended to kill the debate and 
get on with business (see next section), the tactic was 
partially successful for a time. But the debate was rekin-
dled when the ‘Burka Report’,4 which the Committee had 
commissioned from the University of Copenhagen, was 
made public and documented beyond reasonable doubt 
what most had suspected, namely that in the entire coun-
try very few people wore the Niqab and only a handful 
or less the Burka. 
Th e reaction by the Conservatives (and the Danish 
People’s Party, which in the meantime had warmed to the 
idea), was not to pull back, but to claim that the report 
was unscientifi c, bungled, useless, and the researchers not 
worth their money. In any case, it was argued (and the 
Prime Minister supported this position), the problem was 
not the quantitative extent of the problem (although this 
was precisely what the report had been asked to chart), 
but the very existence of these pieces of headcloth and 
what they symbolized.
In this context, the interesting point is that the Burka 
(or rather, the image of the Burka) is systematically de-
ployed as a symbolic boundary-marker: something that 
physically separates us from them, individual identity 
from anonymous collectivity, communication from iso-
lation, familiarity from peculiarity. Th e Burka comes to 
symbolize a refusal to integrate and participate in civic 
society, replacing the traditional phenotypical inferiority 
markers of, for instance, black skin or plump negroid fea-
tures. Th e Burka – or just the imagined Burka, if it refuses 
to materialize in real life – turns into a kind of negative 
phenotype of Islam, the symbol par excellence demon-
strating that although lots of ‘them’ walk ‘our’ streets and 
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reside in ‘our’ neighbourhoods, there is an unbridgeable 
divide. Th e Burka transforms from a religious-cum-cul-
tural garment for ‘them’ into a political weapon for ‘us’.
Th at at least was the intention. Th e result was slightly 
diff erent, and is closely connected to the reason a Burka 
‘panic’ had to be invented – a symbolic construct ex nihilo 
rather than a positive fact politically instrumentalized: 
integration and participation, inclusion in other words, 
are proceeding apace in Denmark (see further below); 
the Cartoons have moved into the realm of high politics 
and are no longer very useful for domestic purposes of 
cultural marginalization;5 and political Islamism is, if 
not absent in Denmark, at least a fringe phenomenon, 
separated from mainstream Muslims’ everyday activities 
and identities. Th e implication is a change of political 
symbolism too. Th e symbolic politics of borders does 
not disappear, but old, generalized, all-exclusive borders 
against immigrants as such multiply and bifurcate into 
on the one hand the oxymoron of ‘boundary symbols 
of integration’ (see below) and on the other militarized 
symbols of (in)security, panic and emergency, connected 
partly to terrorism and the Danish war eff orts in Af-
ghanistan, partly to ongoing domestic gang and drug 
warfare, comprising drive-by shootings and other violent 
showdowns over the distribution of illicit drugs (both 
territory and revenue) between motorcycle gangs (mainly 
Hell’s Angels) and criminal groups of ‘immigrant’ thugs, 
predominantly in Copenhagen. 
Old dichotomies reappear in new guises. We now 
fi nd offi  cial symbols of peaceful togetherness hand in 
hand with hard-liner gestures of separation, exclusion 
and open contempt for the alien Other. Th e new border 
is one between the good and the evil Other, angelic versus 
demonic diff erence – an overlay on the basic antagonism 
between us and them. We know the latter well enough 
– exemplifi ed not just by the Burka, but notably by the 
Cartoon image of the prophet with a bomb in his turban, 
which has now entered a new phase and taken its place 
within a new confi guration of boundary-drawing. Th e 
former, however, is a relative newcomer on the stage of 
symbolic politics and is well captured by the second im-
age at the top of this section – which appeared recently 
on as the front-page illustration of the magazine titled 
NyIDanmark [New in Denmark], no. 1, 2010, published 
regularly by the Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and 
Integration.
Th e baby, peacefully at rest, in the context of the spe-
cifi c institutional and communicative setting unequivo-
cally represents the idea of a just as peaceful, organic and 
unproblematic an integration process through Danish 
socialization from birth. Interestingly, at fi rst glance the 
baby is depicted as an autonomous organism, alone, with-
out parents or just a mother cradling and nursing it – as if 
the invisible boundary-line between a somewhat non-in-
tegrated mother and her integration-prone off spring has 
found its way into the image as an absent zero signifi er. 
Th us at fi rst blush the picture is an essentialist represen-
tation of untarnished assimilation material ready to be 
moulded into ‘Danish’ shape. Th is is the counter-image 
to the traditional and negative perception of immigrants 
as threats to the natural (depoliticized) state.
However, the more functional, realistic and down-to-
earth alter ego representation of the front-page image has 
found its way into the magazine itself. Th e front-page in-
fant anticipates the thematic focus of the issue: ‘toddlers’. 
For, as the subtitle states in so many words, ‘integration 
starts at birth’. Th e thematic section features inter alia 
a prominent article unravelling the narrative of a single 
Muslim role-model mother of six, quoted for saying that 
‘my kids must be given the best possible start’. She has 
fought and eventually divorced a paternalistic, tradition-
alist Muslim husband, who, unlike the mother, did not 
think it desirable to place their kids in public child care 
or for that matter allow them to entertain any contact 
with Danish institutions of socialization. Th e 40-year-old 
role model, on the other hand, insisted and fi nally got her 
way, though she allegedly had to struggle not just against 
her ex-husband, but also the prejudices of the Danish 
caregivers. ‘You can hang on to your core Muslim values 
and get integrated from day 1 – as long as you cooperate 
well with institutions’, as she is reported to have said in a 
foregrounded statement. 
Th e functional pragmatism of this position – comple-
menting the organicism of the front-page photo – is pic-
torially represented by a snapshot showing her – wearing 
a headscarf, but no Burka – carrying her three-year-old 
son on her lap. Th ey have both successfully challenged 
the boundary between us and them, having chosen sides 
wisely while leaving the former husband and father be-
hind on the other side. Th e inclusion/exclusion process 
is no longer a simple separation between ethnic others 
and ethnic Danes, but increasingly takes place within 
the category of the Other, pragmatically at fi rst perhaps, 
but at a later stage the reward of total assimilation – the 
front-page lure, where the boundary has not just been 
modifi ed but has evaporated – waits around the corner.
Th is novel discourse is interesting mainly for three 
reasons: fi rst, it imagines a new social reality of us and 
them, even an ideal reality where a substantial part of 
them (notably women, who were often vilifi ed in previous 
alien stereotypes) become active instruments of integra-
tion; second, integration is portrayed as a less-than-purist 
process, where social participation and cultural diversity 
are acknowledged to co-exist (running against the tradi-
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tional Danish mono-cultural, assimilationist grain); and 
third, it rather accurately refl ects a new reality of shift-
ing and dislocated boundaries, less overt politicization of 
the fi eld, and a well-documented greater degree of parity 
between old and new Danes as regards participation on 
the labour market, in civil institutions, in the housing 
sector, in (higher) education and in public debates – as 
e.g. Hans Lassen has convincingly argued in a recent 
series of articles.6 Immigrants and descendants are begin-
ning to emerge in labour-market, housing, electoral and 
crime statistics as almost average Danes, and particularly 
the wide gaps that used to exist as regards occupational 
frequency between ethnic Danes and newcomers from 
non-Western countries are closing fast – whether or not 
this is the result of policies pursued by the government, of 
more realistic attitudes adopted by new generations and 
‘types’ of minority Danes in a novel economic context, 
or of a normal integration and adaptation rhythm which 
commonly takes a few generations to set in – or, most 
likely, a combination of all three, In other words, the 
discourse implicitly points toward the boundaries (=lim-
its) of symbolic politics in this area, the point where the 
politics of symbols and the demonizing symbolization of 
an impermeable us/them boundary is no longer useful 
(perhaps even dysfunctional) and is therefore being re-
placed by more ‘innocent’ and utilitarian concepts.
A few additional refl ections on this important theme 
in Denmark and in the wider global context are appropri-
ate at this stage of the argument.
5. Th e boundaries of symbolic politics: on sym-
bolism and Realpolitik
Th e high-profi le politicization of the immigrant domain 
which has characterized Danish politics for many years 
and has set the agenda for the securitization of the fi eld 
and the attendant SP emergency discourses of threatened 
boundaries and identities is markedly on the wane. Th is 
development represents partly a process of ‘normaliza-
tion’, where immigration issues are starting to become 
treated as just any other ordinary political problem and 
less as the election-winning trump card (which it has been 
for the past decade), and partly as a process of shifting 
priorities, since the crisis has made it clear that crisis prob-
lems of rising unemployment, faltering economic growth 
and undesired outsourcing to the Far East cannot be re-
solved by blaming the alien immigrant or by managing 
immigration diff erently. Th us, emergency talk within a 
changing political culture has become displaced from the 
SP of immigrant demonization to problems of small-state 
adaptation to a new global economic and political order. 
Th e combined eff ects of ‘normalization’ and ‘displace-
ment’ (bolstered by increased immigrant participation 
in Danish societal aff airs), ‘eff ectiveness’ and ‘legitimacy’ 
(Lipset 1963: 64 ff .) of political rule, are to minimize 
the need for the SP of paranoid boundary-drawing, since 
immigrants and immigration no longer lend themselves 
ideally as objects of rhetorical strategizing and political 
positioning. Immediate, hard-core interests override the 
symbolization of identities.7
Th e interesting corollary of these refl ections is that 
tough anti-immigrant discourses and Othering strate-
gies connected to them are manifestations of phases and 
situations typifi ed by a surfeit, not a defi cit of political, 
cultural and economic capital – which is how problems in 
this fi eld have normally been orchestrated. In the Danish 
context, this must be understood in the specifi c historical 
context of ‘right-sizing’ and ‘right-peopling’ the national 
territory and the Staatsvolk (O’Leary, Lustick & Callaghy 
2001: 15-73) on the background of a long history of na-
tional defeats, territorial diminution, unfortunate inter-
national alliances and even loss of sovereignty (Adriansen 
2003; Kaspersen 2008; Østergård 2006). Th ese threats 
were gradually and, as it turned out, rather successfully 
overcome in the post-war years, where Denmark learnt 
to adapt internationally while building welfare, solidarity 
and consensus domestically – on the basis of a decidedly 
‘monocultural polity’ with a clear and all-dominant ethno-
national core giving no political concessions (specifi c mi-
nority rights or descriptive representation) to other ethnies 
(Campbell, Hall and Pedersen 2006; Hedetoft 2010). Th e 
historical failure of ‘right-sizing’ found its complement in 
attempts to at least ‘right-people’ the remaining national 
territory. In other words, Denmark’s post-war successes 
were founded on the solid ground of ethnic homogene-
ity, laying the foundation of anti-immigrant (diversity) 
anxieties and demands for assimilation, and making it 
understandable why vote-catching strategies and sym-
bolic politics connected to immigrants were never far 
away, bursting into full bloom in the mid-1990s (when, 
interestingly, Denmark’s economy was booming, not de-
clining). Th e combination of previous failures (many of 
them dating back to a multinational and multicultural 
past prior to the historic defeat to Prussia in 1864) and a 
successful mono-cultural aftermath set the stage for path-
dependency reactions, even of a demonizing, rigid and 
racist kind. Th e symbolic politics of immigrant Othering, 
for that reason, bears interesting reminiscences to the 
symbolic politics often adopted by minorities for claims-
making purposes in contexts where they need to win the 
ear of political majorities seen to dominate and impose 
their cultures on them (e.g. in Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia); on this count, Danes have reacted in the vein 
of and inspired by their historically perceived minority 
status vis-a-vis Germany and other larger international 
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players. Th e Volksgeist replete with historical memories 
of misfortunes and menaces of foreign origin, it is hardly 
surprising that in a more successful phase attributed to 
cultural consensus and ‘horizontal solidarity’ via welfare 
institutions, ‘right-peopling’ – in a country invariably 
seeing itself as ‘little Denmark’ – has been connected 
to ‘ethnic domination’ by Danes and Danish culture, in 
a process reminiscent of historical vindication. In this 
light, it is, if not conceptually correct at least metaphori-
cally apt that Danes are frequently categorized as a tribe 
(Mellon 1992; Gundelach 2002).
Th e turbulence that the Danish immigration debates 
and policies have undergone over the last 20 years or so 
should in no small measure be analyzed in this context. 
It is obvious, on the other hand, that the politicization of 
the fi eld in this manner is crucially dependent on being 
able to refer to (or better: conjure up in symbolic ways) 
successes that stand to be forfeited if immigrants either 
do not integrate better or stay away. In the current cri-
sis, such strategies, if maintained and supported, would 
develop into outright fascism, and have for that same 
reason little purchase in Denmark, where the wish to 
celebrate Danish identity in quasi-mythical terms is off set 
by a just as outspoken pragmatism (Hedetoft 1995, 380 
ff .), economically and politically. Hence the current nor-
malization and ‘depoliticization’ tendency: the reality of 
globality has, in a manner of speaking, forced Danes and 
not least their politicians to review their strategies and top 
priorities, and here traditional boundary talk and knee-
jerk objects of demonization will not work and cannot 
be allocated a central role. Now it is truly ‘the economy, 
stupid’, and while the tough rhetoric of Othering, crisis 
and emergency has not entirely left the scene, it is now 
predominantly reserved for the high-politics domain of 
terrorism, security and border control. Th e demons are 
increasingly being represented as Al Queda-inspired pup-
pets of evil intent, but there is no longer an invisible or 
explicit sign of equation between such present-day incar-
nations of fascist insanity and the ordinary run-of the-
mill person of non-Danish extraction.
6. Perspective:  symbols and politics in the new 
migratory world order
Th e Danish case is of course in some ways peculiar to 
Denmark. But in a European and global context of in-
creased trans-state learning processes and policy conver-
gence, it also contains some central references to more 
generic characteristics and developments. Multicultural 
policies and discourses have been widely overtaken by co-
hesion talk, which accepts diversity, but only if diversity 
can be instrumentalized in national contexts (Vertovec & 
Wessendorf 2010). Integration regimes, e.g. as refl ected 
in proliferating ‘points’ schemes,8 increasingly make no 
bones about the importance they attach to measurable 
criteria of immigrant usefulness, and are much less con-
cerned than previously with projecting themselves along 
humanitarian, moral or ethical lines – but also less con-
cerned with beating the drum of demonization. Now the 
offi  cial message is more unequivocal, more cynical, but 
also less essentialist: ‘they’ need to prove their usefulness, 
and if they do, they are practically accepted as part of 
‘us’ – at least for a time. For a corollary of integration, 
permanent residence, acquisition of citizenship, oaths of 
allegiance and ritualizing integration ceremonies is, eve-
rywhere, a new openness toward temporary migrants, 
time-limited utility and ‘circular migration’ (Neerup 
2009; Ruhs & Martin 2006). All the rest do not belong, 
should stay put where they are or at least well away from 
our shores – be they national or regional. In this world 
of utilitarian globalism, diverse, fl uid and composite as 
it necessarily is, the need for essentializing Us/Th em 
boundaries, ethnic identity constructions and a symbolic 
politics bolstering and legitimizing the in-group in the 
face of impending cultural threats is in less demand. It 
will never go away as long as the nation-state remains the 
key unit of the global order. But the more ‘right-sizing’ 
of the people becomes (widely accepted as) a question 
of political and economic utilitarianism, not just by the 
odd individual state but by international institutions and 
regimes across the board, drawing the line between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable others – quasi-scientifi cally 
‘right-sizing’ the other in terms of ‘integration potential’ 
– will be a question of institutional technology and politi-
cal managerialism far more than symbolically separating 
angels from demons. 
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Notes
1. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper are a revised and adapted version of 
arguments off ered in Hedetoft 2007.
2. Symbols are diff erent from two other categories of signs: icons (e.g. 
photographic representations) and indexes (e.g. metaphors and me-
tonymies), both of which carry inherent traces of the link between 
the image itself and its reality referent – in other words, are both 
somehow or other ‘motivated’ images. Th is implies that symbols 
are more open to cultural manipulation, political spin, and new 
applications in changing contexts.
3. Further on these three modalities and other theoretical refl ections 
on symbolic politics, nationalism and transnational identity forma-
tion, see Hedetoft 2007.
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4. Th e full report can be accessed at http://www.e-pages.dk/ku/322/
5. Th e Cartoon Aff air marks the high point of symbolic politicization 
of the undesired alien (read Muslim) other in Denmark. Th e time 
was ripe for it fi ve years ago, the case condensing popular senti-
ments, media discourses and political agendas into one compact. 
Th e moral panic of those days bred on fertile soil: restrictive im-
migration policies, post-9/11 security anxieties, and a general neo-
conservative reaction against liberal nationalism and globalization. 
Today some of the after-eff ects of the Aff air persist in Denmark (and 
copycat versions have popped up in Sweden, Norway, Holland and 
other countries too), but it is out of sync with the current Zeitgeist 
and the current normalization tendency of integration practices.
6. See Politiken, June 1-5, 2010. Th e articles were based on Hans Las-
sen’s recent book, Den anden virkelighed. Tanker og tal om inte-
grationen i Danmark [Th e other reality. Th oughts and fi gures about 
integration in Denmark – Lassen 2010]. See also the report Inte-
grationsStatus [Integration Status], January 2010, which the news 
agency Ritzau had commissioned from the survey house Catinét, as 
well as attendant media comments (http://www.infomedia.dk/ms/
Default.aspx). Th e report showed that immigrants and descendants 
are fast making their way into the middle classes, representing sig-
nifi cantly increased social mobility; that the importance of religious 
identity is on the wane; and that minority women are doing particu-
larly well in the educational system and on the labour market.
7. Th is point only partially applies to the DFF, who are desperately 
trying to keep the SP of immigration alive, since this is the core ele-
ment of their electoral and parliamentary successes so far. Clearly, 
however, they are paddling against the current, as reactions to their 
recent proposal of raising the 24-year rule for mixed marriages to a 
28-year rule have demonstrated. Th e attempt by the Conservatives 
to capitalize on the decline of SP as regards immigrants has been 
analyzed above and failed for the same reasons.
8. Including Denmark, where a political deal between the govern-
ment and DFF in March 2010 involves the introduction of a new 
points scheme, according to which permanent residence can only 
be achieved after the successful collection of 100 points. See e.g. 
Politiken, March 15, 2010, for the text and related comments. 
